Introduction
A situation in which sets of players can realize joint payoffs by cooperating can be formulated as a cooperative game (N, v) , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and v : 2 N → R a characteristic function with v(S) the joint payoff that the players in S ⊂ N can obtain by cooperation. In the standard approach it is assumed that any coalition S can form and achieve worth v(S). However, there are many situations of interest where cooperation among people depends on how they can communicate and coordinate.
In a seminal paper, Myerson [13] formulates such games with communication structure by a triple (N, v, L) , where N is a set of players, v : 2 2 TU-games with communication structure 
A tree (N, T ) is a directed graph, with T a collection of exactly n − 1 directed edges, such that from exactly one node, called the root, there is a unique directed path to every other node. In a tree the root has no predecessor and any other player has exactly one predecessor. On the other hand, a player may have multiple successors. A player j is a subordinate of i in T if T contains a directed path from i to j.
In the game (N, v, L), a coalition S of players can only cooperate and realize its worth v(S) if S forms a network. In the rest of the paper, we assume without loss of generality that N is connected, so N itself forms a network and can realize its worth v(N ). Otherwise, the analysis can be done analogously for each component in the graph (N, L).
When each pair of players can communicate directly
is said to be a game with complete communication structure and often shortly denoted by (N, v) .
, it fully distributes the worth v(N ) of the grand coalition N to all its members. A solution for games with communication structure is a mapping F that assigns to every game with communication structure (N, v, L) a set of payoff vectors
The best-known set-valued solution for games (N, v) is the core, see Gillies [6] , which assigns to every game (N, v) the set 
i.e., the core is the set of efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any network S.
i.e., the value of coalition S equals the sum of the values of its components in (S, L(S)). The best-known single-valued solution for games (N, v) is the Shapley value, see Shapley [16] , which assigns to every game ( [9] . For a game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) the average tree solution is the average of n specific payoff vectors. More precisely, each payoff vector corresponds to one player and this vector is determined by the unique spanning tree (N, T ) for the cycle-free graph (N, L) in which that player is the root of the tree. On the class of games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution has been axiomatized by component efficiency and component fairness. In [9] it is also shown that if the characteristic function of the game satisfies superadditivity, the average tree solution lies in the core C (N, v, L) .
To extend and generalize the average tree solution to the class of all games with communication structure, first notice that when a graph (N, L) is not cycle-free, not all links are needed to communicate. For a particular player i, every spanning tree on (N, L) having player i as root describes a possibility in which player i is able to communicate with the other players. We only consider spanning trees in which any player is linked to just one successor in every component of the set of his subordinates. To describe this class of spanning trees, we first give the definition of an admissible n-tuple of coalitions. 
) is equal to B h for some player h being linked to player i. The same condition also implies that every set B i is a network.
Given an admissible n-tuple of coalitions B, we interpret B i as the set of subordinates of player i together with player i himself. We define the directed graph (N, T B ) as
The notion of admissible n-tuples has the following properties.
Lemma 3.2 For a graph (N, L), let B be an admissible n-tuple of coalitions. Then the following properties hold.
(1) There exists a unique player i ∈ N such that B i = N .
) is a spanning tree.
Proof. From Condition (1) of Definition 3.1 it follows that
Next we continue this procedure with every j chosen in the previous step for which the network B j is not a singleton. We proceed in this way until all remaining networks are singletons. It follows immediately that T B is a spanning tree, which proves (3). Observe that, for all j ∈ N, B j \ {j} is the set of subordinates of player j in the spanning tree T B . Therefore, there is a unique i ∈ N for which B i = N , which proves (1).
To prove (2) consider two nodes i and j. Because T B is a spanning tree, either
is a spanning tree, there is j = i, j such that B i ⊂ B j and B j ⊂ B j . Let B j be the minimal set with these properties. Moreover, there is no
Property (2) 
is the vector of payoffs given by all i ∈ N . We remark that spanning trees that are not induced by an admissible n-tuple of coalitions do not yield a payoff vector that has this property.
We now define the average tree solution as the average of all marginal contribution vectors over the collection of admissible n-tuples of coalitions.
Definition 3.5 Average tree solution
On the class of all games with communication structure (N, v, L) , the average tree (AT) solution assigns the payoff vector AT (N, v, L) given by
The number of admissible n-tuples depends on the structure of the graph (N, L). In the next section we discuss two special cases, cycle-free graphs and complete graphs. 
, let j ∈ K be the unique player in K such that {j, j } ∈ K . Then, again by Condition (2) of Definition 3.1, B j = K . Continuing this procedure as long as there are components consisting of more than one player, we obtain the unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions
Using this lemma we show that for games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution coincides with the solution introduced in Herings et al. [9] for this particular class of games. When (N, L) is cycle-free, let T 
where, for j ∈ N , K i j is the set of nodes consisting of j and all its subordinates in T i . The average tree solution for games with cycle-free communication structure as introduced in Herings et al. [9] then yields the average of these n marginal contribution vectors.
Theorem 4.2 For a game with cycle-free communication structure (N, v, L) it holds that
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 we have that for any i ∈ N there is a unique admissible n-tuple of coalitions with B i = N . Let B(i) be this n-tuple of coalitions. From the construction in the proof of Lemma 4.1, it follows immediately that the spanning tree T
B(i)
corresponding to B(i) coincides with the unique spanning tree T i having i as its root. Hence m
Next we prove that for games with complete communication structure the average tree solution coincides with the Shapley value. Observe that for a complete graph each of the n! admissible n-tuples of coalitions generates a path graph, i.e., each player has exactly one successor and one predecessor, except the first chosen player who has no predecessor and the last chosen player who has no successor. On the other hand, any given path graph corresponds to the permutation in which the last chosen player enters first, the second last chosen player enters second, and so on.
Core properties
In this section we provide conditions for arbitrary games with communication structure under which the average tree solution lies in the core. For a game (N, v) it is well-known that the Shapley- 
value φ(N, v) is in the core C(N, v) if the game is convex, the requirement that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for every S, T ⊂ N .
A game is superadditive if these inequalities are satisfied for every S and T such that S ∩ T = ∅. Superadditivity is insufficient to ensure that a game has a non-empty core. We say that a game with
is superadditive. It can be shown that a superadditive game with cycle-free communication structure has a non-empty core. In particular, it follows from Demange [5] that any marginal contribution vector m
is permutationally convex for any permutation corresponding to the spanning tree T i and then, according to Granot and Huberman [7] , m
) for all i ∈ N . So, for superadditive games with cycle-free communication structure the average tree solution is in C (N, v, L) , because the core is convex. Also for games with cycle-free communication structure, Talman and Yamamoto [18] provide a condition even weaker than superadditivity under which the average tree solution is still in the core. We next introduce the notion of link-convexity, which will be shown to assure that the average tree solution is an element of the core for an arbitrary game with communication structure.
Definition 5.1 Link-convexity
for any S, T ⊂ N that satisfy
(1) S, T, S \ T, T \ S, and (S \ T ) ∪ (T \ S)
are non-empty networks,
Notice that Condition (1) of Definition 5.1 implies that S ∪ T is a non-empty network. Link-convexity reduces to convexity for the class of games with complete communication structure because for those games all subsets of N are networks and convexity is satisfied trivially when S, T, S \ T, or T \ S equals the empty set. We illustrate the concept of link-convexity with an example. 
is not a network. Therefore, for the game with cyclic communication structure the link-convexity property requires that
for all sets S = [i, i ] and T = [j, j ] such that j > i and further j = i + 1 or j = i − 1, i.e., the two sets must be such that S ∪ T and S ∩ T are both networks.
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The next theorem shows that the average tree solution is in the core if the game is link-convex.
Theorem 5.3 If the game with communication structure
Proof. We show that under link-convexity any marginal contribution vector m
, is an element of C (N, v, L) , which proves the result because the core is a convex set.
Consider
(N ) and let S 1 , . . . , S k be the components in the subgraph (S, T B (S)). Since S k is connected, the directed subgraph (S k , T B (S k )) is a tree and there exists a unique
Since S is a network and because of Property (2) of Lemma 3.2 it holds that there is one node, say, r k , such that for every i ∈ I \ {r k } the node i is a subordinate of r k and therefore
for some i ∈ S k } be the set of successors of S k in the tree T B outside S. We define J = ∪ i∈I F i as the set of all such successors. For j ∈ J, let
We define N = I ∪ J and the directed graph ( N , T ) by
Clearly, ( N , T ) is a tree with root r k .
For
Without loss of generality, let r 1 , . . . , r k be such that k 
By repeated application of this argument and since
Notice that this formula is also valid if
By repeated application of the last inequality, we find that
Since S ∪ B k = B r k and T is a tree, it follows that every B r k , k = 1, . . . , k − 1, appears exactly once in the right-hand side, and we obtain The following example illustrates that link-convexity is strictly weaker than superadditivity and also that the Myerson value may not be in the core if the game is link-conevex. 
Indeed, all these inequalities are satisfied for the game. Observe that this game has a unique core element (0, 2, 4, 0) .
The average tree solution for this game is equal to the average of the marginal contribution vectors of the spanning trees induced by the four admissible 4-tuples B 
Concluding remarks
In this paper the average tree solution is proposed for the class of all games with communication structure. This solution generalizes both the solution introduced by Herings et al. [9] for the class of games with cycle-free communication structure and the Shapley value for the class of games with complete communication structure. We introduce the condition of link-convexity under which the average tree solution is an element of the core. For the class of games with cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is weaker than superadditivity. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity, and only coincides with it for games with complete communication structure. Following this study, Baron et al. [1] define and axiomatize the average tree solution for any class of spanning trees. They also investigate several properties of the average tree solution. In particular, they prove that the set of spanning trees induced by the class of admissible n-tuples of coalitions is the largest class of spanning trees satisfying that the corresponding average tree solution has the Harsanyi property.
